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ABSTRACT
The analyses below compare the career histories and personal characteristics of the executives in
the top ranks of the world’s largest and most stable business operations, the Fortune 100, between
1980 and 2001.  To our knowledge, there have been no prior studies of contemporary changes in the
experience or attributes of executives beyond CEOs.  In 2001, these executives were younger, more
likely to be women, and less likely to have been Ivy League educated.  Most important, they got to
the executive suite about four years faster than in 1980 and did so by holding fewer jobs on the way
to the top. (In particular, women in 2001 got to their executive jobs faster than their male
counterparts --there were no women executives in the Fortune 100 in 1980).  Executives in 2001 also
spent about five years less in their current organization and were more likely to be hired from the
outside than in 1980.  Interestingly, the most stable firms – the 26 that were in the Fortune 100 in
both periods – had just as much lifetime employment among executives in 2001 as in 1980, although
changes in other aspects of careers were similar.  Overall, the path to the executive suite and the
attributes of the individuals who get there appear to have changed even in the largest and most stable
business operations.
Peter Cappelli






The Wharton School 
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370
hamori@wharton.upenn.edu  2 
 
The Path to the Top:  
Changes in the Attributes and Careers of Corporate Executives  
1980 to 2001 
 




Multinational corporations are among the most important economic actors in the world.  
The largest of them have more economic assets than all but the biggest countries.  They 
are engines of cultural and economic change that can alter the economic fates of entire 
nations.  The people who control them, in turn, have arguably as much power and 
influence as all but the highest-ranking government officials.  Understanding who they 
are is therefore relevant to understanding the corporations and how they operate.   
 
In addition to knowing the attributes of the people who run large corporations, it is also 
important to understand the path that took them to these powerful positions.  These paths 
say a great deal about access to positions of influence, about social mobility generally, 
and specifically about career development practices.   
 
Research on these questions has a long history, especially in the U.S. where notions of 
social mobility are central to national culture and values.  Popular biographies of the 
“robber baron” generation and its leading figures like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew 
Carnegie reinforced the notion that individuals became business leaders through hard 
work or, in the case of manufacturing leaders like Henry Ford and Thomas Edison, 
inventive genius, typically overcoming hardships in the process.  Arguably the first study 
to examine this meritocratic thesis was Pitirim Sorokin’s 1924 study of millionaires in the 
U.S.
2  He compared an older generation of millionaires to the then current generation and 
found that while about half of the former had come from middle or upper class 
backgrounds, three quarters of the latter had done so.  This suggested to him that society 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Jimmy George, Joyce Huang, Patricia Hwang, Alvaro Pinto, Stacy Shi and Clifford Song for 
careful assistance collecting the data for this study, to Emilio Castilla for helpful comments, and to Jim 
Baron for the conversation that motivated it.  
2 Pitirum Sorokin.  American Millionaires and Multi-Millionaires: A Comparative Statistical Study.  
Journal of Social Forces 3(4) 1925, pp.627-640.   3 
was becoming less meritocratic and that it had become more difficult to work one’s way 
up economic and class levels.  
 
Carl S. Joslyn and Frank W. Taussig aimed their study of social mobility precisely at 
business executives.
3  They studied the backgrounds of 7,371 executives drawn from the 
ranks of corporate directors in the 1920s.  While they found that the vast majority of 
these executives had fathers who were also businessmen, and that this percentage actually 
had grown over time, they also found that 11 percent had fathers who were laborers.  
They focused on this finding and concluded that individuals with merit could work their 
way to the top of the business community. Differences in the probability of advancement 
by social class, they argued, were the result of differences in merit and ability – the upper 
class had more able people.   
 
A number of studies followed the Joslyn and Taussig investigations in examining more 
closely the origins of the business leadership in the U.S. William Miller looked into the 
backgrounds of 190 of the most elite executives -- Presidents and Chairmen of Boards of 
Directors of the largest companies in the most important industries – at the beginning of 
the industrial age, from 1900-1910.
4  What was interesting about this group, and in 
contrast to business leaders from earlier generations, is that most were professional 
managers, not the founders or entrepreneurs who had started the businesses.  Miller 
concluded that half had come from upper class backgrounds and only 5 percent from 
working or lower-class families.   Frances Gregory and Irene Neu looked back even 
further in time at the backgrounds of business leaders just before the beginnings of the 
modern corporation in the 1880s.  They found that most of the business leaders before the 
turn of the last century had inherited money, which allowed them to invest in and then 
become leaders of companies.
5 The meritocracy argument was no longer looking 
credible. 
 
A generation later, the notion of a corporate career with entry-level jobs and promotion 
from within was more fully in place.  Lloyd Warner and James Abbeglan attempted to 
                                                 
3 Carl S. Joslyn and Frank W. Taussig.  1932.  American Business Leaders, New York: MacMillian. 
4 William Miller.  American Historians and the Business Elite.  Journal of Economic History 9(2) 1949. 
5 Frances W. Gregory and Irene D. Neu.  The American Industrial Elite in the 1870s.  in William Miller 
(Ed). Men in Business.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952.     4 
replicate and extend the Joslyn and Taussig study.  They looked at the background and 
careers of 8300 corporate executives in 1953 and found far fewer founders or 
entrepreneurs in the ranks and relatively fewer members of the rich or idle class than had 
the Joslyn and Taussig study.  There was also a sharp decline compared to earlier studies 
in the percentage of executives who had inherited their positions or who were in the same 
firm as their fathers.  What Warner and Abbeglan saw instead was something that looked, 
at least relative to earlier periods, like an increase in more meritocratic arrangements.   In 
an era when about half of men did not even finish high school, they found that roughly 
half of the executives of large companies they surveyed were college graduates (three 
quarters had attended college), and 20 percent had gone on to graduate school.  By far the 
most common route to the top was to begin either in sales or as a clerk in the company 
(34 percent of future executives).  The next most common path began in production work 
(14 percent).  The most striking statistics, however, concerned the stability of their career 
in the same company.  The executives they surveyed averaged 54 years in age, they had 
been in their current executive job seven years, and had spent 24 years in their current 
firm, roughly half their life.  Almost 50 percent had only worked at their current firm, and 
26 percent had been an executive at only one other firm.
6 
 
At roughly the same time, Mabel Newcomer undertook a systematic assessment of 
changes in executive careers over time that focused on their experiences inside their 
corporations.
7  She looked at the background and experience of the very top executives – 
Presidents and Board Chairmen – for the largest companies in 1900, 1925, and 1950, 
around 400 individuals in each period.  This sample was more elite in terms of the 
importance of their positions in the organization and the importance of their organizations 
than earlier studies.  Newcomer’s results reinforced the conclusion that top executives 
were increasingly professional managers (as opposed to entrepreneurs or financiers) who 
were promoted to the top from within the company where they began their career.  The 
extent to which these leaders held positions in companies where their father or close 
relatives worked declined from 26 percent in 1900 to 16 percent in 1925 and then to 11 
percent in 1950.  In 1925, 30 percent had begun their careers as entrepreneurs.  By 1950, 
                                                 
6 W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abbeglen.  Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. 
7 Mabel Newcomer. The Big Business Executive: The Factors that Made Him, 1900-1950.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1955.   5 
that figure was down to 10 percent.  More important for the study here, half of these 
leaders were hired from outside their corporations in 1900, but by 1950, only 20 percent 
were outside hires.  That number was substantially higher than the 50 percent estimate 
that Warner and Abbeglen had found for all executives, suggesting that this more elite 
population was more likely to have been developed from within than was a more typical 
executive.  In 1950, 47 percent of Newcomer’s sample retired in office, as opposed to 
only 11 percent in 1900.  Of those who retired in office, 40 percent had been with their 
firm more than 40 years in 1950, in contrast to 21 percent in 1925 and only 5 percent in 
1900.   
 
 
In part as a result of the Newcomer study, ideas about what constituted a business career 
changed.  The dominant notion now was that a business career was an organizational 
career, that is, it operated inside a corporation.  William H. Whyte, an editor at Fortune 
magazine, became arguably the best-known commentator on the rise of the new 
organizational career with his famous book, The Organization Man.  He cites a study by 
the Booze-Allen consulting firm which asked what was seen at the time as a novel question: 
why would executives ever leave their corporation?  Its study of 422 executives who had left 
their first employer found that they did so only if their corporation could not deliver on its 
implicit promise of upward mobility.
8  A series of studies throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
went on to map out the intricate details of how careers played out in practice, such as 
Rosabeth Kanter’s famous account of in-breeding at the pseudonymous “Indisco” 
corporation.
9  There were some hints through the 1970s that perhaps things were changing 
for executive careers.
10  But for the most part, the question of whether executive careers 
had changed in any fundamental way would not be questioned for more than a decade. 
 
                                                 
8 William H. Whyte. The Organization Man.  New York: Harper 1956. 
9Rosabeth Moss Kanter. 1977.  Men and Women of the Corporation.  Boston: Basic Books, p.130-140.  
10 A smaller survey of corporate Presidents from the American Management Association in the late 1970s 
found that 38 percent had been outside hires, as opposed to only 20 percent in the Newcomer study 
conducted a generation before.  The authors concluded that “One can argue that there is a trend toward 
selecting the professional manager from the outside as opposed to encouraging the internal succession route 
to the top.”Gene F. Brady, Robert M. Fulmer, and Donald L. Helmich.  Planning Executive Succession: 
The Effect of Recruitment Source and Organizational Problems on Anticipated Tenure.  SMJ Vol. 3 1982, 
269-275.   6 
A New Era in the 1980s?  A number of studies have argued that the early 1980s 
represented a watershed moment for the U.S. economy and for corporations in particular.  
The worst recession since the Great Depression in 1981 unleashed a massive wave of 
corporate restructuring.  The rise of deregulation and global competition, especially in 
manufacturing and most prominently from Japan, greatly increased the pressure to 
improve performance while the growing power of institutional investors and the 
shareholder value movement increased the demands to improve financial performance.  
Together these forces were seen as continuing the wave of corporate restructuring, and 
terms like “downsizing” and “reengineering” as well as record levels of mergers and 
acquisitions became a continuous part of the business landscape.
11 
 
In the 1990s, the issue of career paths once again became a topic of interest because of 
concerns that downsizing was disrupting traditional patterns of advancement.  
Specifically, the apparent willingness to lay off white collar workers and managers broke 
the old notions of lifetime job security.  Growing problems with employee retention in 
the 1990s suggested that employees were no longer interested in secure, lifetime careers, 
and the anecdotal sense was that outside hiring for executives was becoming more 
popular as a means of restructuring leadership, and organizations, more quickly.  The 
conceptual notion that careers should be thought of as spanning more than one 
organization – “The Boundaryless Career” – became popular in organizational 
psychology.
12  But empirical research on this question was virtually nonexistent.  A flurry 
of articles debated the issue of whether employee tenure was falling across the workforce 
as a whole,
13 and there was some evidence that white collar and managerial job tenure 
was declining faster than for the overall workforce. [Cite Kletzer, Farber, me.] Whether 
internal labor markets and associated career paths were eroding was also a topic for 
                                                 
11 Among the more influential arguments that the U.S. economy had undergone fundamental and painful 
change in this period was Michael L. Dertouzos et al. Made in American: Regaining the Productive Edge.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.  Peter Cappelli, et al.  Change at Work.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, suggests that the economic restructuring of the 1980s had a range of negative consequences for 
employees. 
12 Michael B. Arthur and Denise M. Rousseau.  The Boundaryless Career.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996. 
13 See, e.g., David Neumark (ed).  On the Job: Is Long-Term Employment a Thing of the Past? New York: 
Russell Sage, 2001.   7 
debate
14.  Especially for the executive ranks, however, there was little hard evidence one 
way or the other on these issues.     
 
The Present Study:  
The issue motivating this study is the nature of executive careers and how they may have 
changed in recent decades.  Among the specific questions to consider is whether 
individuals with different attributes are getting to the top now, replicating a question from 
earlier studies.  The more contemporary question is whether the path through which 
executives have gotten to the top has changed.   There are many different ways to 
examine these questions, and they begin with the choice as to which sample of executives 
to examine.  The definition of executive jobs is not completely straightforward.  For 
example, how far down the organizational chart does one go before “executives” become 
“managers”?  How should one address the fact that organizational charts are not 
consistent across companies and the titles used for executive positions differ?  And how 
should one compare equivalent job titles across companies of very different sizes – is a 
Vice President of a small company an executive?   
 
Earlier studies addressed these questions in two different ways.  One was to sample  
individuals, not jobs, by relying on published directories of executives or biographies of 
leading business figures such as “Who’s Who.”  The alternative approach was to base the 
sample on specific job titles in existing corporations, the approach we use because it 
makes it more likely that we are comparing individuals holding equivalent executives 
positions over time: We know that they come from equivalent corporations, and we can 
assess the job titles to ensure that the individuals we examine truly hold the appropriate 
executive positions.   
       
We collected information on the top executives from the Fortune 100 companies – the 
100 largest companies in the world in terms of revenue – in 1980 and in 2001.  We focus 
on these 100 corporations precisely because they are the largest and most stable 
corporations with the scale to manage internal employee development and career 
programs.  This sampling frame stacks the deck against finding change given that these 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., the exchange between Sanford Jacoby and Peter Cappelli in California Management Review, 
Vol. 42 No1. Fall 1999.   8 
are the companies most likely to be able to persist in the traditional, organizational career 
model.   As a practical matter, limiting the study to 100 corporations also made the data 
collection exercise more manageable.  The year 1980 was chosen as being just before the 
watershed recession of 1981 and providing a means of seeing whether the period since 
then does indeed represent a breaking point in careers for executives.  The year 2001 was 
the one with the most recent, reliable data available when we began work on the project 
in 2003.  
 
We defined “top executives” as those business leaders with fundamental influence of 
corporate-wide operations in these organizations, the people who truly direct the strategic 
decisions of the companies.  They include the very top positions - President, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), and Chairman\Chairperson and Vice-Chair of the Board of 
Directors.  Often the same individual will hold more than one of these titles.  Board 
Chairs and Vice-Chairs do not have to be executives of that corporation, and we only 
included those in our study who were.  Next we included Chief Operating Officer, 
Executive Vice Presidents (EVPs) and Senior VP’s.  The executives in these jobs 
typically head functional or operating areas of the corporation, and they sometimes have 
more than one area under their responsibility (e.g., EVP for “administration,” which may 
encompass human resources and facilities operation).  Senior vice presidents (SVPs), the 
next level down, hold similar positions in organizations that do not use the EVP title.  In 
companies that do have EVPs, the SVP job directs a single area or function.  We also 
included Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Technology Officer/Chief Information 
Officer and other heads of specialty areas.  Vice-Presidents and Group Presidents, who 
typically head a division of the corporation, were the next level, and where operating 
divisions are very large, Group Vice-Presidents may also have responsibility for 
important strategic decisions.  
 
Organizational charts differ widely across companies.  As described below, some do not 
use the EVP title, the use and position of “CIO/CTO” varies, others combine titles, etc.  
The top group of executives across two similar companies may therefore have different 
job titles. Because of this, it could be misleading to base the selection of top executives 
strictly on a fixed set of job titles.  Instead, our sampling decision was to examine the top 
10 executives in each company in 1980 and 2001.  In practice, this approach meant   9 
working down the organizational chart from the top job until we got to the 10
th individual 
in the hierarchy.  Our sampling decision, therefore, did not attempt to compare executive 
titles but instead relied on what we see as a simpler and more robust, nonparametric 
approach of examining the top10 executives in each corporation.  
 
The information we collected on each executive  examines  demographical attributes, 
educational background, and career histories. Demographical attributes included the year 
when the executive was born and the executive’s gender.  Educational background 
included the type of degrees that the executives earned (Bachelor’s, Master’s, Ph.D or 
equivalent, as well as the field of the degree), the name of the educational institutions 
from which the executives received their degree, and the year when they received it. We 
examined each degree separately. For each degree granting educational institution, we 
collected additional information  on whether the institution  is an Ivy League  school, 
whether it is a college or a university, and whether it is a public or private institution.  
The Ivy League and public institution variables measure aspects of social elitism. Career 
history-related information included data on  executives’ entry-level jobs  and on each 
subsequent job up to their current executive position -- typically six to 12 different jobs. 
For each job, we collected information regarding the year when the executive started that 
position, the job title, and the name of the company where it was located. In some cases, 
the name of the division or the function where the executive had the job was also 
collected to help determine whether a “new” job was a lateral transfer or a promotion.  
 
For the sample of 1980 Fortune 100 executives, we collected data from two printed 
sources: the Dun & Bradstreet reference book of corporate managements (1980 volume, 
Publisher: Dun & Bradstreet, Bethlehem, PA) and the Standard & Poor’s register of 
corporations, directors and executives: United States and Canada (1980-1981 volume, 
Publisher: Standard and Poor, New York). Both list the names of the top executives with 
their title, and typically their educational background along with a brief biography. In 
both directories, the most commonly listed titles include: the Chairman and the President, 
the Vice-Chairmen (about 3 in number), the Executive VPs (about 4), the Senior VPs 
(between 7 and 10), and the VPs (between 10 and 39). The two directories were not 
always consistent in their information, however. The most common area of disagreement 
concerned  the number of  senior vice presidents and  executive vice presidents in a   10 
corporation.
15  For the sake of consistency, we used the Dun & Bradstreet directory and 
resorted to the Standard & Poor’s directory only if information on the career history of 
executives was missing from the Dun & Bradstreet directory.  Data on entry-level 
positions was especially likely to be missing, and we pursued a variety of print sources to 
fill in the missing information, an issue we return to below. 
 
The set of Fortune 100 executives  for 2001 comes from two online and three printed 
sources. The Hoover’s Online electronic database served as the main source of data for 
2001 Fortune 100 executives. For each corporation, Hoover’s Online lists the holders of 
the top executive positions (Chairperson, CEO, Vice-Chairmen, SVPs, EVPs, VPs and 
board members) with their biographical information in text format. Unfortunately, this 
source omits a great deal of career history information.  W e used t he Lexis-Nexis 
database to supplement missing biographical data on the executives. We also consulted 
printed directories to fill in the gaps in career paths, including the Dun & Bradstreet 
reference book of corporate managements (2001 volume, Publisher: Dun & Bradstreet, 
Bethlehem, PA),  the  Standard & Poor’s register of corporations, directors and 
executives: United States and Canada (2001 volume, Publisher: Standard and Poor, New 
York) and Who’s Who in finance and industry (2002 volume, Publisher: Marquis group, 
Chicago). As with the 1980 data, information on entry-level positions was the most likely 
to be missing, especially so for executives who switched companies.   
 
In practice, it was sometimes impossible to identify enough information on some 
executives to include them in the data base.  Skipping over these executives to take the 
others further down the organizational chart would create a complicated bias because 
corporations with more missing data would end up with more lower-level executives.  
Comparisons across establishments would therefore be to different levels in the 
organization.  Our decision was to not sample further when not enough information was 
available to include an executive, which meant that there were cases with fewer than 10 
executives in the same corporation.  Similarly, there were also many cases where the 10
th 
executive was one of several who held the same title in the organizational chart.  For 
example, the 10
th executive may have been one of three who held the SVP title.  Rather 
                                                 
15 In the case of General Motors, for example, the Dun & Bradstreet directory lists four EVPs, while the 
Standard & Poor’s directory lists three.   11 
than making an arbitrary distinction as to which of these should be the 10
th executive, we 
included all of them.    
 
The database that we constructed contains data on 1962 executives -- 802 executives 
affiliated with Fortune 100 companies in 1980 and 1160 affiliated with Fortune 100 
companies in 2001.  The number is more than the expected 1000 in 2001 because of the 
inclusion of multiple position holders as noted above.  It is less than the expected 1,000 
for the 1980 sample because of much greater incidence of incomplete information.  We 
consider the issue of an unbalanced sample below.  Within the overall sample, it was still 
the case that data on at least one variable was missing for about one-third of the 
executives.  The issue of missing data is potentially important, and we also examine it at 
some length below. 
 
Company Descriptions and Organizational Charts: 
In addition to Fortune Magazine, which is the source for identifying the Fortune 100 in 
1980 and 2001
16, w e collected information on the companies  per se  from Hoover’s 
Online databases (for company age and 2001 financial data) and from the Compustat 
database (for 1980 financial data). The information included the year when the company 
was founded, the industry that the company belongs to, its total assets, total sales and net 
income in 1980 and 2001, and its position in the Fortune 100 rankings.  
 
Despite the fact that the Fortune 100 represents what one would think of as among the 
most stable corporations in the world, there is considerable turnover in that list over time.  
Only 26 of that select group from 1980 made it into the Fortune 100 in 2001.  They are: 
  Boeing           Caterpillar Tractor 
  Chevron          Coca-Cola 
  Conoco          Dow Chemical 
  E.I. Du Pont de Nemours      Exxon Mobil 
  Ford Motor          General Electric 
  General Mills          General Motors 
  Georgia-Pacific        Honeywell Intl 
                                                 
16Geoffrey Colvin. The Fortune directory of the 500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations. Fortune. 101(9): 
274 May 5, 1980 and Clifford Lee. Fortune 5 Hundred. Fortune. 143(8): 100. April 16, 2001.   12 
  IBM            International Paper 
  Johnson & Johnson        Lockheed Martin 
  Marathon Oil          PepsiCo 
  Philip Morris          Phillips Petroleum Co 
  Procter & Gamble        Texaco 
Union Pacific          United Technologies 
 
Table 1 illustrates how the distribution of the Fortune 100 changed by industry over this 
period.  The changes by industry group are often dramatic -- the decline of the 
manufacturing sectors (from 17.1 percent to 1.1 percent of the total) and the rise of 
financial services (from zero to 16.9 percent) are especially striking.  The change in the 
composition of the Fortune 100 raises important issues concerning the source of any 
changes in executive-related attributes and experience that are examined below.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of Fortune 100 by Industry – 1980 and 2001 
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The Fortune 100 companies differ across the two periods in other ways as well.   As 
Table 1A indicates, the companies in 2001 are significantly older, despite the apparent 
turmoil in the economy since 1980. They are also significantly bigger in financial terms.  
Total sales, for example, were more than four times greater.  The differences in financial 
size cannot be accounted for by inflation over this period, which totaled only 115 percent.  
The average number of employees is also greater, albeit only by about 34 percent. 
Overall, then, the Fortune 100 companies are substantially bigger in 2001 than in 1980. 
(The final column in Table 1A indicates the significance level of any differences between 
the 1980 and 2001 cohorts based on difference of means tests.)   Other things equal, then, 
one might assume that the executives in the 2001 sample held more important positions 
because their organizations were so much larger than equivalent executives from the 
1980 sample: An SVP from the 2001 sample may have greater responsibilities than an 
EVP from the 1980 sample.  Offsetting this conclusion is that fact noted above that there 
are more missing observations in the 1980 sample.  The missing observations were more 
likely to be for lower-level executives than more senior ones as information was more 
likely to be missing for lower-level executives.  The 1980 executives, therefore, may on 
balance represent slightly more senior positions within their companies than do the 2001 
executives.  But because the 2001 executives hold positions in more substantial 
organizations, the two biases therefore work in opposite directions and may cancel out.  
 
Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics for the Fortune 100 in 1980 and 2001 
 
  Year  N  Mean  Sign 
Age of the company  1980  778  81.0347  .000 
  2001  1160  96.1448   
Number of employees  1980  802  104436.8  .000 
  2001  1160  136614.2   
Total Assets  1980  802  7812.0  .000 
  2001  1160  147017.9   
Sales  1980  802  11224.6  .000 
  2001  1160  50426.1   
Net Income  1980  802  557.4  .000 
  2001  1160  2151.0    
Note: Total assets, sales and net income are in million US dollars. 
       
Change in Organizational Charts: Table 2 shows how the distribution of executives by   14 
job position changed in the two periods.  The biggest changes are the sharp declines in 
the use of EVP titles and the stand-alone President title as well as big increases in the use 
of the Group President titles and the emergence of the Chief Operating Office title. More 
details of job titles are provided in the Appendix – Tables A-C offer details on the 
distribution of executives by title, Tables D-G provide details on how that distribution 
differs by industry in 1980 and 2001.  Among the findings there is greater use of multiple 
job titles in 2001 – 36.2 percent had these titles versus only 11.7 percent of all executives 
in 1980 (see Table C). 
 
Table 2: Organizational Chart for Executive Positions, 1980 to 2001 
 
Titles    1980 frequency and percentages  2001 frequency and percentages 
CEO                                        4  .5 
CEO2                                        57  7.1 
CEO3                                        6  .7 
Chief Officer of a function       3  .4 
Chairman                           42  5.2 
Chairman2                           2  .2 
EVP                                      219  27.3 
Group President or Group VP 55  6.9 
President                          58  7.2 
President2                          20  2.5 
Senior executive VP              5  .6 
Senior VP                          291  36.3 
SVP2                                      4  .5 
Vice Chairman              28  3.5 
Vice Chairman 2              6  .7 
VP                                      2  .2 
Chief Officer2                         0 
EVP2                                       0 
Group P or VP2                       0 
SEVP2                                     0 
VP2                                          0 
Total                                      802  100.0 
Note: The number 2 or 3 following a title 
indicates that the incumbent held that title 
in addition to 2 or 3 others. 
15        1.3 
83  7.2 
36  3.1 
35  3.0 
31  2.7 
1  .1 
213  18.4 
157  13.5 
11  .9 
26  2.2 
12  1.0 
234  20.2 
88  7.6 
35  3.0 
22  1.9 
7  .6 
9  .8 
100  8.6 
22  1.9 
2  .2 
21  1.8 
1160  100.0 
 
Another way to look at the distribution of titles that is arguably more revealing of 
changes over time is to rank them based on their typical position in an organizational 
chart.   Not all companies have exactly the same hierarchy of titles (see Appendix for 
representative corporate charts), but there is little debate that the three general tiers of   15 
executive titles reported in Table B of the Appendix do form a hierarchical relationship.  
Interestingly, the percentage of individuals holding positions in the top third of executive 
titles declined (1980: 27.6% vs. 2001: 22.6%) as it did for those in the middle tier (1980: 
65.1% vs. 2001: 59.9%).  But the distribution in the lower third expanded considerably 
(1980:7% vs. 2001:18.5%), consistent with the notion of flatter hierarchies. 
 
Changes in the Attributes and Experiences of Top Executives: 
In the analyses below, we turn to attributes of the individuals who hold top executive 
positions as well as aspects of their career experiences and how they have changed from 
1980 to 2001.  We examined the following variables: 
   
Job Title and Promotions: In order to examine the career paths of these executives, we 
identified the hierarchy of positions that a typical executive held over the course of their 
career and organized those jobs into 13 different categories: 1. Non-managerial jobs; 2. 
Assistant manager; 3. Manager; 4. General manager; 5. Assistant director; 6. Director; 7. 
Assistant vice president; 8. Vice president; 9. Senior vice president; 10. Chief functional 
officers (CFO, CTO); 11. COO; 12. Executive vice president; 13. President, Chairman, 
CEO. In cases when an executive had two or three titles (e.g. President and CEO, 
President and COO), the code for the higher-ranking title was used.   
 
We look at the course of their careers (“Number of Positions”) as measured by the 
number of positions they went through before becoming a top executive.   We use the 
numerical coding above to generate a simple calculation -- an absolute value difference 
score -- of the size of an executive’s promotion (or in some cases demotion).  A move 
from Assistant Director (5) to Vice president (8), for example, receives a score of 3.  This 
is a nonparametric measure, and as such it may not accurately or even consistently reflect 
the true increase in position across different points in a career (e.g., is the above move, 
with a score of 3, truly equivalent to a move from Chief Functional Officer (10) to CEO 
(13), which also gets a score of 3).  There is no obviously preferable approach, 
however.
17  We take the average of these promotions to generate an “Average Promotion 
Size” measure.  Calculating the size of a promotion compounds issues of measurement 
                                                 
17 For example, one could generate scales for jobs based on responsibility, on skill requirements, on 
compensation.  Generating these hierarchies is the task of job evaluation systems in personnel psychology, 
and there are limitless variations as to how it is done.   16 
error because the estimate is the difference between two measures/titles, each of which 
may be estimated with some error.  It might therefore be reasonable to interpret this 
measure with some caution. 
 
Years of Education:  The biographical data on executives, unlike standard survey data, 
only reports degrees completed and not years of education received. For comparison 
purposes,  we  follow conventions used elsewhere and  translate these degrees into the 
typical years of education associated with them -- a high school degree corresponded to 
12 years of education, a Bachelor’s to 16, a Master’s to 18 and a PhD to 20.   
 
Nature of Educational Institution: For each degree, we calculate whether the institution 
from which the degree was earned was an elite, Ivy League school or a public institution.  
(The omitted group  is private, non-Ivy League  institutions.)   Ivy League educations, 




Tenure:  We calculate  two measures  of  tenure for these executives.  The first is the 
amount of time spent in their current organization – “Organizational Tenure.” The second 
is based on tenure in each job they held during their career as measured by the year when 
an executive started each new job subtracted from the year in which they started their 
previous job.  The “Average Job Tenure” represents the number of years that it took the 
executive to get to their current position divided by the number of jobs that the executive 
has held.   
 
Lifetime Employees: We also report the percentage of executives who began their careers 
at their current company and are still there at the point of data collection.  
 
Time to Top: The “Time to top” measure represents for the number of years that it took 
the executive to reach his or her top position beginning with the year when the executive 
                                                 
18 There are only eight Ivy League schools – Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Penn, 
Princeton, and Yale.  Clearly there are other schools that historically have drawn from the socially elite as 
well, but calculating exactly where that line of demarcation fell was even more arbitrary than the Ivy 
League classification.     17 
started his or her first job.
19  Time to the top differs from organizational tenure in that it 
reflects an entire career, including time spent working in other organizations.  
  
Analyzing what is “different” about these variables in 1980 versus 2001 is not completely 
straight-forward as there are many aspects of statistical distributions that can be 
compared across two periods.  The most obvious and arguably most relevant here is 
whether the mean values of the variables differ across the two periods, an assessment that 
can be generated by simple difference of means tests.  Mean values can be distorted by 
outliers, however, and for that reason it is also useful to examine whether the median 
values for these variables are different in the two periods.  We use a median test, a special 
case of Pearson’s chi-square test, to examine whether the median values from the two 
periods are identical.   Finally, we use   Kruskal-Wallis Test for K 
Independent Samples 
the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test to examine more broadly whether the distributions 
of responses from the two periods are independent.  This test combines observations from 
the two periods, assigns them ranks,  
and then calculates  , the average of the ranks of the observations in the ith sample. The 
test statistic is then   
and the null hypothesis that the distributions are the same is rejected if  .  
                                                 
19 Where dates for entry-level positions were missing, we estimated their years of work experience by 
subtracting their years of education from their age.   18 
In virtually all cases, the median and Kruscal-Wallis test results are similar to the 
difference of mean tests and are therefore only reported where there are differences.  The 
Appendix reports the complete results for the analyses used most often, those for the full 
sample.   
We begin the analyses by comparing the demographic and human capital attributes of the 
Fortune 100 executives in 1980 and 2001. 
 
Table 3: Human Capital Comparisons in 1980 and 2001 samples 
  YEAR  N  Mean  Sign 
Gender of executive (1=male)   1980  801  1.00  .000 
  2001  1159  .89   
Age of executive  1980  704  56.04  .000 
  2001  705  51.9   
Years of Schooling  1980  726  17.02  .000 
  2001  802  17.26   
1
st Degree Institution         
Public (=1)  1980  728  .32  .000 
  2001  778  .48   
Ivy League (=1)  1980  728  .14  .017 
  2001  778  .10   
2
nd Degree Institution         
Public  1980  345  .26  .021 
  2001  496  .34   
Ivy League  1980  345  .35  .000 
  2001  496  .21   
3
rd Degree Institution         
Public  1980  38  .29  .832 
  2001  74  .27   
Ivy League  1980  38  .21  .592 
  2001  74  .26   
 
 
The results in Table 3 above suggest some striking differences between the characteristics 
of executives in 1980 and 2001. ( Significance levels f or d ifference of means tests 
between the two periods are reported in column three.)  First, there are more women in 
these executive positions in 2001 – not a difficult achievement given that the number was 
zero in 1980.  Eleven percent of the incumbents in these positions in 2001 are women   19 
who differ f rom their male counterparts in important ways (examined below).  A m ore 
surprising change is that the average top executive is considerably younger in 2001 – 
more than four years younger than in 1980.
20   It is not immediately obvious why this 
should be the case.  Economic growth that might have pulled younger executives into the 
top ranks, e.g., was not noticeably stronger during the career of the 2001 executives (from 
roughly 1970 to 2000) than during the career of the 1980 executives (1950 to 1980).
21 We 
return to this issue below. 
 
Average years of education for top executives are significantly higher in 2001, roughly in 
line with higher levels of education  for the population as a whole  over this period. 
(Median years of education are not significantly different, however.) The more important 
changes concern the type of institutions that these executives attended.  In 1980, a full 14 
percent of top executives in the Fortune 100 companies attended one of eight Ivy League 
institutions for their undergraduate education. Only 32 percent attended public or state-
sponsored schools.  Michael Useem and Jerome Karabel examined the educational 
background of 3105 Fortune 500 executives in 1977 and found some roughly similar 
results -- 11 percent had only a first degree f rom one of 10 elite, private institutions; 
about 22 percent had a second, professional degree (MBA or Law degree) from one of 
these institutions.  They found that holding a bachelors degree from an elite institution 
increased the odds on becoming CEO by 42 percent.
22  In 2001, in contrast, only 10 
percent of the equivalent executives received undergraduate degrees from Ivy League 
schools, and  forty-eight percent attended public institutions.  Another aspect of these 
findings  is that t he percentage of executives who attended private, non-Ivy League 
institutions (i.e., non-public and non-Ivy) therefore fell sharply across the two periods, 
from 54 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 2001.   
                                                 
20Given an average age in 1980 of 56, the 1980 ex ecutives would have been 22 – a typical graduation age -
- in 1946.  But many of these executives would have had their education interrupted by service in World 
War II, so it is quite likely that many attended college after the War, graduating closer to 1950.  The 2001 
executives with an average age of 52 would have graduated roughly in 1972.  Some of these, but a much 
smaller percentage than for the earlier cohort, would have served in the military during the Vietnam War.  
Differences in the incidence of military experience may account for some of the age difference in the two 
cohorts. 
21 Early retirement programs associated with downsizing and corporate restructuring might have created 
more opportunities for younger executives, given that they tend to target older employees.  But the jobs 
examined here are the very top positions that are not the group typically targeted by early retirement 
programs.     
22 Michael Useem and Joan Karabel. 1986.  “Pathways to Top Corporate Management. “ American 
Sociological Review, 51(2): 184-200.   20 
   
This change in educational background may reflect a difference in the characteristics of 
the entry-level hires in each period:  Although the pool of four-year college graduates 
from which these corporations  typically  hired did not in fact shift toward public 
institutions over this period,
23 o n average,  hiring  practices may have  shifted toward 
public university graduates. The change in educational background may also reflect a 
change in the attributes of those who were promoted after being hired: On average, Ivy 
League graduates may have had a much higher rate of promotion in the earlier period. It 
is impossible to tease out the answer from these data,
24 but it is reasonable to conclude 
that the erosion in the importance of an elite alma mater and the shift toward public 
institutions more generally  was the result of changes in corporate practices  and not 
demographics.     
 
Does the above finding indicate that corporations became less elitist and more open to 
students from all levels of society in this period? The results for second degrees suggest 
an even greater change. There is something of an increase in the proportion of second 
degrees among these executives by 2001, and the decline in the percentage that came 
from  Ivy League institutions was much  greater than for first degrees. (Most of these 
degrees are MBA or law degrees, and there are only five Ivy League law schools and six 
MBA programs.
25)    A more accurate story about changing access to these top executive 
jobs, therefore, might be as follows: In 1980, an Ivy League undergraduate education 
played a   central role as a gatekeeper to a Fortune 100 executive career.  By 2001, 
graduates from public institutions had greater access to executive positions, especially 
those with advanced degrees.  A simple explanation for the change, possibly a cynical 
one as well concerning the role of elitism, is just that  the Ivy League represented a 
smaller share of the population of graduates over time, especially in the exploding area of 
professional degrees where the scale of Ivy League programs was particularly small.   
 
                                                 
23 In the 1950s, when the 1980 executives would have been hired, four-year graduates from public 
institutions were equal to 34 percent of the graduates from private institutions.  That figure rose only to 35 
percent by 1970, when the 2001 executives would have been hired.  See Table 243 “Degree Granting 
Institutions by Control and Type of Institution,” Digest of Educational Statistics, National Center for 
Educational Statistics: Washington, D.C. 2002.  
24 There are other possible explanations as well.  The preferences of the students may have changed,, e.g., 
interest in corporate jobs disproportionately eroding in Ivy League institutions during the latter period. 
25 Princeton and Brown have neither a law school nor a business school.  Dartm outh has a business school 
but no law school.   21 
Table 4 presents descriptive results  for changes in  career  experiences over the two 
periods. These measures could be especially sensitive to the missing data issues noted 
earlier.  To illustrate, because missing data was more common for entry level jobs, an 
analysis that ignored these missing jobs could make it appear that executives made it to 
the top more quickly.  The missing information is also more likely to occur for those 
executives who have moved across companies.  Individuals that began careers elsewhere, 
therefore, might appear to have advanced more quickly because information on their first 
jobs was omitted.  These issues matter for the 1980-2001 comparisons because missing 
data was more common for the 1980 sample.  We address these issues first by restricting 
the analysis only to those  executives  for whom we have complete data.  One 
complication with this approach  is that  it excludes disproportionately more executives 
who switched companies.  A second approach, therefore, is to use the full sample and 
impute estimates for the missing data, typically the first job, by using the convention in 
labor economics of estimating when first jobs began by subtracting years of education 
from current age (the assumption is that careers began when one left school). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Top Executives, 1980-2001 
Full Sample            
  Year  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Sign 
Lifetime employees           
  1980  749  .53  .499  .001 
  2001  1099  .45  .498   
Time to the Top           
  1980  735  28.38  6.52  .000 
  2001  778  24.11  8.93   
Average Job Tenure           
  1980  740  4.32  2.44  .012 
  2001  771  3.99  2.62   
Average Promotion Size           
  1980  802  1.10  .91  .004 
  2001  1160  1.25  1.21   
Number of Positions Held            
  1980  761  5.76  2.27  .000 
  2001  1104  5.04  2.60   
Organizational Tenure           
  1980  742  20.63  10.94  .000 
  2001  916  15.15  11.80    
Sample Restricted to 
Complete Career History  
         
  Year  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Significance   22 
Lifetime Employees           
  1980  367  .60  .491  .001 
  2001  515  .48  .500   
Time to the Top           
  1980  373  28.31  6.147  .000 
  2001  395  25.00  7.293   
Number of Positions Held            
  1980  379  6.6544  2.18322  .004 
  2001  524  6.1565  2.78111   
Average Job Tenure           
  1980  373  4.1850  1.88447  .889 
  2001  395  4.1631  2.43006   
Average Promotion           
  1980  379  1.5907  .69847  .000 
  2001  524  1.9034  1.02796   
Organizational Tenure           
  1980  469  23.69  10.46  .000 
  2001  591  18.65  11.79    
 
The results in Table 4 are revealing.  There was a large and significant decline over this 
period in the percentage of top executives who spent their entire career at the same 
company  –  12 percentage points in the sample with complete career data, falling 
somewhat to eight points in the full sample.  If, as noted earlier, more data is missing for 
executives who switched companies, then eliminating observations with incomplete data 
would tend to disproportionately eliminate executives who switched firms and account 
for a higher estimate in the restricted sample.   Average tenure for these executives in 
their current company, a related statistic, dropped between 1980 and 2001 by almost a 
full five years. The average levels were higher in both 1980 and in 2001 for the restricted 
sample, again presumably because missing data excluded more executives who switched 
companies and therefore had lower tenure.  But the size of the drop in tenure between the 
two periods was nearly identical  in the full sample  to that in the restricted sample.  
Differences in median tenure are even sharper, dropping by seven and a half years (see 
Appendix). 
 
The other important development  in Table 4  concerns the  nature of the  path to the 
executive suite.  Average time to the top is less in 2001 than in 1980, a result that is 
consistent with the younger age reported for executives in 2001. (The gap is smaller but 
still significant for the restricted sample, and the levels are also lower for both periods.)  
The reductions in time to the top do not necessarily lead to reductions in organizational   23 
tenure, however.  Organizational tenure is considerably less than time to the top in both 
periods as these executives apparently spent several years working in organizations other 
than their current employer.  It is clearly possible for individuals to get to executive jobs 
sooner by spending less time working for these earlier employers while not reducing time 
with their current employer, but in fact the opposite appears to be happening.  The 
declines in organizational tenure appear to be larger than the declines in time to the top.   
 
The average amount of time these executives spent in each position was not that different 
in 2001 than it was in 1980 -- a little over four years -- although it was significantly 
smaller in 2001 for the full sample.
26  (Significance levels were higher for both the 
median and Kruskal Wallis tests.) The explanation for the more rapid promotion path of 
executives in 2001 is that they  held fewer jobs on their climb up the corporate ladder.  
There were fewer stops along the way.  And, as the data above indicate, the average size 
of a promotion was therefore bigger. (Significance levels for the alternative tests were 
lower here.) These results are consistent with the perception that corporate hierarchies are 
flatter now such that the difference in responsibilities between positions at each level is 
greater.
27  Moving at the same speed up a ladder with fewer steps means one gets to the 
top faster.   
 
An obvious question is whether executives get ahead faster by switching companies.  
Does loyalty and stability in the form of a lifetime career in the same company slow 
down advancement?  Interestingly, the evidence for 1980, when the “Organization Man” 
model of internal promotion appeared to still be firmly in place, suggests that the answer 
was yes.  Results from analyses available on request suggest that those executives who 
changed companies in the 1980 cohort got to the top about a year quicker than did those 
who remained with their first company, a statistically significant difference.  Despite 
spending significantly more time on average in each job they held, executives who 
changed companies held fewer positions on their climb to the top and got there faster as 
compared to those who were lifetime employees.  The results for 2001, however, do not 
find significant differences in time to the top for those who changed companies.  Perhaps 
                                                 
26 For observations where information on jobs was missing, the estimates were calculated only for those 
jobs were information was available.  An analysis of the number of jobs these executives had along the way 
to the top could only be calculated reliably where information on entry-level jobs was available. 
27 See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan and Julie Wulf (2003), “The Flattening Firm:  Evidence from Panel Data on 
the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies”, NBER working paper No. w9633. April, 2003.   24 
the greater frequency of switching corporations in the more recent period has reduced the 
relative advantage associated with doing so. 
 
Finally, we compare the amount of time spent in each job that executives report in their 
path to the top in 1980 and 2001.  Executives vary in the number of jobs they held and, as 
one would imagine, there are considerable differences in the titles of jobs that  each 
executive held.  This makes it next to impossible to draw comparisons by job title.  We 
can, however, compare the amount of time executives in 1980 spent in their first job – 
whatever its title – with the amount of time executives in 2001 spent in their first job, and 
so on over the course of their careers.   The differences in Chart 1 below are statistically 
significant only for jobs 1-4 and job 12, but these results suggest that the 2001 pool of 
executives spent slightly more time in their initial jobs, then sharply less time in their 
fourth position (the modal title of which was “general manager”) before moving on.
28 
























The  overall  results  presented above  for 1980  seem reasonably  consistent with those 
reported by other studies  for earlier periods.  The Warner and Abbeglen figure of 50 
                                                 
28 Again, it is important to remember that these results are not comparing identical jobs, only jobs based on 
the order in which the executives held the,.  The results are especially difficult to interpret for the higher 
numbered jobs:  Job #12, e.g., is always the current or “top” job for those who reported having held 12 
jobs, but those executives who held fewer jobs in total would report that their current or top position was, 
say, job # 9.     25 
percent noted earlier for the proportion of executives who were lifetime employees ithe 
1950s included lower-level executives from smaller companies, but it is only slightly less 
than the figure here.  The average age of the executives in 1980 – 56 – is quite close to 
the Warner and Abbeglen estimate of 54 – again, the Fortune 100 executives were on 
average more senior in level, and that may explain the small difference. More important, 
average organizational tenure is very similar in their study (24 years) and in 1980 (23.69 
in the restricted sample).   These results suggest that career patterns  may have been 
reasonably similar from the 1950s through 1980, suggesting that the post-1980 period 
may well represent an important breaking point in corporate careers.  A contemporary 
study by Murphy and Zabonjnik of CEO turnover over this period found a similar 
pattern.  They found that the proportion of CEOs having been at their firm less than one 
year grew only slightly from 15 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1980 but then rose 
sharply to 25 percent by the 1990s.
29 
 
Explanations for the Differences: 
A first step in attempting to explain the above differences between the 1980 and 2001 top 
executive cohorts is to ask to what extent they truly  result from changes in corporate 
employment practices over time or, alternatively, from spurious sources such as changes 
in the type of companies that make up the Fortune 100.  As noted earlier, we know from 
Table 1 that the Fortune 100 in 2001 was made up of very different kinds of corporations 
than in 1980.  Perhaps the overall changes noted above simply result from the fact that 
service industries have different practices than the manufacturing industries and were 
much more prominent in the sample in 2001 than in 1980.  In the language of 
demographics, to what extent are the changes in outcomes that we observe truly the result 
of “period effects” – something about the modern period that caused all executives in 
large firms to have different attributes and experiences? Or was the change the result of 
“cohort effects” – the type of firms in the Fortune 100 changed in 2001, and that change 
drove the results described above.   
 
We can begin to examine this question by restricting the analysis to the 26 companies 
that were in the Fortune 100 in both 1980 and 2001.  Any changes in the attributes and 
                                                 
29 Kevin J. Murphy and Jan Zabonjnak.  Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs.  Marshall School of 
Business, University of Southern California, December 2003.    26 
experience of top executives in this restricted sample by definition result from changes in 
practices within those companies over time.  We can then compare those results to the 
ones reported above for the entire sample (all Fortune 100 companies in 1980 vs. 2001).  
The extent to which they are substantially similar suggests that the overall results 
reported above are driven by period effects; the extent to which they are substantially 
different suggests that the overall results are driven by cohort effects. 
 
Table 5: Top Executive Attributes and Experiences in 1980 and 2001  
for 26 Companies in Both 1980 and 2001 Fortune 100 
  YEAR  N  Mean  Std. Dev.  Sign 
Gender of exec  1980  225  1.00  .000  .000 
  2001  307  .94  .241   
Age of exec  1980  193  56.82  5.92  .000 
  2001  258  53.50  6.55   
Years of Schooling  1980  216  17.01  1.29  .264 
  2001  232  17.18  1.88   
1
st degree institution           
Public u  1980  217  .37  .484  .017 
  2001  214  .49  .501   
Ivy League  1980  217  .12  .331  .057 
  2001  214  .07  .256   
2
nd degree institution           
Public u  1980  103  .29  .457  .048 
  2001  145  .41  .494   
Ivy League  1980  103  .29  .457  .008 
  2001  145  .15  .360   
3
rd degree institution           
Public u  1980  14  .43  .514  .177 
  2001  27  .22  .424   
Ivy League  1980  14  .21  .426  .585 
  2001  27  .30  .465   
Lifetime Employees           
  1980  220  .67  .472  .635 
  2001  298  .69  .464   
Time to the Top            
  1980  216  29.24  5.79  .000 
  2001  275  26.98  6.44   
Average Job Tenure           
  1980  218  4.36  2.94  .024 
  2001  240  3.82  2.17   
Average Promotion Size           
  1980  226  1.16  .75  .031 
  2001  307  1.34  1.07   
Number of Jobs Held            
  1980  223  6.22  2.40  .170 
  2001  301  6.65  3.10   
Organizational Tenure             27 
  1980  221  23.29  10.40  .038 
  2001  265  21.14  12.03   
 
The considerably smaller sample size with these analyses no doubt contributes to the fact 
that not all of the differences between the two periods are statistically significant, but the 
results are broadly similar to those reported for the entire sample above.  In particular, the 
differences are in the same direction except for the striking result that the percentage of 
executives who began their careers in the same company  is marginally higher in 2001, 
albeit not significantly so. Despite the fact that these companies did not appear to have 
changed their practices with respect to outside hiring of executives, other aspects of their 
career experience have changed, including getting to the top faster by holding fewer jobs. 
These results confirm that executives even in  the same companies had quite different 
experiences over the 1980-2001 period.  T hey lend support to the notion that cohort 
effects  – different kinds of firms populating the Fortune 100  – alone cannot  be 
responsible for the overall differences in attributes and experiences of Fortune 100 
executives from 1980 to 2001.    But they do suggest that the increase in outside hiring of 
executives in the overall sample  could  be attributed to  a change in the  corporations 
making up the Fortune 100.
30   
 
A related question is whether the change in practices described above -- more outside 
hiring, shorter organizational tenure, faster promotions, younger executives, less elite 
college hiring – represent new approaches to corporate operations that are more likely to 
be characteristics of newer firms.
31  The Fortune 100 is clearly older on average in 2001 
than it was in 1980, but it might be that the newer firms within the sample are driving the 
overall results.  If so, the results may represent a variation on the cohort effect theme: 
Firms that started in the later part of the 20
th Century will look and act differently than 
those that started in the 19
th century. And if new firms continue to take over, overall 
corporate practices will shift in their direction.  A finding that younger firms have 
distinctive practices may also represent what demographers refer to as “age effects”: 
                                                 
30 We also compared the attributes and experiences of executives in the 74 companies in 1980 that fell out 
of the Fortune 100 in 2001 to the 74 that took their place.  These results, available on request, effectively 
replicate the results of the full sample.    
31 All Fortune 100 firms are big, but there is a small correlation between age and size in terms of sales --
.139.  Younger firms may therefore be somewhat smaller.  Whether the variation in size is relevant across 
these huge firms is a question for speculation.   28 
Young firms have different practices because such firms are young, and their practices 
will change as they grow older.   
 
The analyses below compare the attributes and experience of top executives in younger 
firms to those in older firms.  The young firm/old firm distinction is a general argument 
that presumably is not specific to either 1980 or 2001, so the analyses examine the 
differences between young and old firms for the pooled sample of Fortune 100 executives 
in both periods.  Few Fortune 100 firms in either period are truly young, and pooling the 
two periods also has the advantage of producing a large enough sample to generate useful 
variance.  Determining where to divide the firms between “young” and “old” is not 
straight-forward.  Because so few Fortune 100 companies are truly new, setting the age 
for “young” too low will lead to a sample that is too small to be useful.
32  We also want at 
least some of the companies in the “young” group to have been around long enough so 
that it is not a logical impossibility for their executives to have grown up in the 
organization.  Indeed, an interesting hypothesis is whether executives who begin their 
careers with a start-up firm that makes it to the Fortune 100 may be more likely to remain 
with that firm because of the opportunities it offers.  Stock options, more significant in 
smaller, fast-growing firms for example, may also hold such executives longer.     
 
Table 6 reports a comparison of the attributes and experiences of Fortune 100 executives 
who are in corporations that are less than 30 years old with those in corporations older 
than 30 years.  Younger firms have younger executives, perhaps not surprising, but no 
more women than the older corporations.  Aside from more public and fewer Ivy grads at 
younger firms, the education differences are not significant.  In terms of career 
differences, the start-up hypothesis above has little support.  Executives in younger firms 
were far less likely to have begun their careers there, and their organizational tenure is 
about half that for executives in older firms.  Executives from younger companies get to 
the top much faster apparently by having fewer steps in their promotion ladder.  Although 
they spend about the same amount of time in each job they hold as do executives in older 
firms, they hold fewer jobs before being promoted into the executive ranks, which 
                                                 
32 Fourteen of the 200 firms in this analysis are younger than 30 years, although some of them existed as 
other entities before mergers and other transformations put them in the top 100.  The youngest firm in the 
Fortune 100 in 2001 was Cisco Systems at 17 years.       29 
implies bigger promotions.  This pattern is consistent with being in organizations that 
have less hierarchy and fewer levels, as many believe is the case for younger firms.  
 
Table 6: Top Executive Attributes by Founding Age of the Company  
  CO_AGE  N  Mean  Std. 
Dev 
Significance 
Gender of exec  30 and below  149  .93  .262  .673 
  over 30  1787  .94  .246   
Age of exec  30 and below  100  51.36  7.67  .000 
  over 30  1287  54.25  7.01   
Years of Schooling  30 and below  96  16.98  1.265  .192 
  over 30  1411  17.16  1.345   
1
st degree institution           
Public   30 and below  95  .46  .492  .231 
  Over 30  1390  .40  .471   
Ivy league  30 and below  95  .13  .417  .791 
  Over 30  1390  .12  .435   
2
nd degree institution           
Public  30 and below  42  .50  .506  .005 
  Over 30  793  .30  .463   
Ivy league  30 and below  42  .12  .397  .027 
  Over 30  793  .27  .468   
3
rd degree institution           
Public  30 and below  6  .00  .000  .121 
  Over 30  106  .29  .457   
Ivy league  30 and below  6  .33  .516  .591 
  Over 30  106  .24  .432   
Lifetime Employees           
  30 and below  139  .17  .379  .000 
  Over 30  1687  .52  .500   
Time to the Top            
  30 and below  91  23.17  7.96  .000 
  Over 30  1400  26.44  8.09   
Average Tenure           
  30 and below  92  4.23  2.74  .733 
  Over 30  1397  4.14  2.54   
Average Promotion            
  20 and below  149  1.08  1.33  .206 
  Over 30   1789  1.20  1.07   
Number of Jobs Held            
  30 and below  141  4.11  1.68  .000 
  Over 30  1702  5.44  2.53   
Organizational Tenure           
  30 and below  118  9.22  7.60  .000 
  Over 30  1518  18.33  11.79   
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Other analyses, available on request, compare the attributes and experiences of 
executives across three corporate age categories; Fortune 100 firms younger than 20 
years; firms from 20 to 70 years; and companies older than 70 years.  There are few 
differences in the human capital attributes between the executives in the young and mid-
aged companies, but there  are important  differences in career patterns: T he younger 
companies have significantly fewer executives who started at the current firm, they have 
less tenure in the organization, and they move to the top more quickly.  There are few 
differences in career patterns between executives in the mid-age and older firms but 
important differences in human capital: The mid-age firms have more women executives 
and older executives who have less schooling. These results reinforce the notion that the 
age of companies has an important influence on executive experiences and that it is the 
youngest firms – presumably the fastest-growing as well -- that have the most externally-
oriented career experience.    
  
Finally, we consider the fundamental manufacturing/service industry distinction.  We 
know that the service sector is different in many ways from manufacturing. Observers 
sometimes see manufacturing firms as more bureaucratic and hierarchical, in part because 
they have more functionally oriented departments.  And we also know that there was a 
significant shift in the Fortune 100 companies away from manufacturing and toward 
service companies in the period 1980 to 2001.  We compare the differences between the 
attributes and experiences of executives in the service and manufacturing sectors in both 
1980 and 2001.  The results, available on request, indicate that, other than more public 
university graduates in manufacturing, there are no significant differences in either the 
attributes or career experiences between manufacturing and service executives in 1980.  
In 2001, in contrast, there are many differences: Executives in the service sector are 
younger, more likely to be women and to be Ivy League graduates.  Most important, they 
are much less likely to have started their career at the same company (41 percent for 
services vs. 54 percent in manufacturing), and they spent four and a half fewer years in 
their current organization.  They also got to the top about two and a half years sooner 
than their peers in manufacturing.  The manufacturing/service distinction apparently was 
irrelevant in understanding differences in executive experience in 1980 but has become 
highly relevant in 2001.       
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Summary 
 
While there has been considerable debate about whether internalized labor market 
practices have eroded in recent years, aside from evidence about CEO turnover, there has 
been relatively little inquiry into this question at the management level and essentially 
none for executive-level positions.  The analysis above focuses on the largest and 
arguably most stable corporations in the world, organizations that one might reasonably 
see as having the biggest investments in the traditional “Organization Man” model of 
internally oriented careers.  The results suggest important differences in the attributes and 
experiences of top executives over the past 20 years.  While the 1980 results seem 
reasonably consistent with studies of executives from the 1950s, a generation earlier, the 
results from 2001 are different in a number of ways.  This lends support to the general 
notion that the period since 1980 represents an important transition point for the economy 
and employment in particular.  Compared to 1980, executives in equivalent executive 
positions are younger, more likely to be women, and more likely to be from public 
institutions. Because it is difficult to attribute these developments to changes in the 
underlying populations in the two periods, it seems much more reasonable to see them as 
being related to changes in the way in which these large corporations operate.  More 
important, the nature of executive career paths has changed.  Outside hiring is much more 
common among top executive in 2001 than in 1980, tenure in one’s company is 
significantly lower, and, perhaps most important, these executives got to the top faster by 
holding fewer jobs.  It is as if the ladder to the top held fewer rungs in 2001, consistent 
with the evidence presented earlier of flatter organizational charts.   
 
Overall, there may be something of a “is the glass half  full or half empty” issue in 
interpreting these results.  Despite all the discussions about corporate job-hopping and an 
open labor market for executives, one might say that almost half of these top executives 
in 2001 were still in the company where they h eld their first job, and the average 
executive had been there 15 years.  There is clearly some stability in the careers of top 
executives in 2001. On the other hand, these are the largest companies in the world with 
the biggest internal labor markets and the strongest policies oriented around promotion 
from within.  If more than half their top executives now come from the outside, roughly   32 
half their careers have been spent elsewhere,
33 and both the percentage of lifetime careers 
and average tenure are falling significantly, them something is clearly different about 
how executive careers operate now.  The “Organization Man” model has clearly eroded. 
 
What explains these differences is less obvious, however.  The 26 corporations that were 
in the Fortune 100 in 1980 and 2001 also exhibited many of the changes in executive 
attributes and experiences over this period. The fact that most of the attributes and 
experiences of executives were different in the same firms over these two periods 
suggests that the changes are likely to be systematic and widespread and not simply the 
result of changes in the type of companies that made up the Fortune 100.  The extent of 
lifetime careers was no different among these firms in the two periods, however, 
suggesting that the decline in lifetime careers that we see in the overall samples must be 
due to the change in the composition of firms in the Fortune 100 between 1980 and 2001.   
 
What characteristics of the sample of firms are driving this change and possibly 
influencing others as well are not obvious, however. We know that younger firms get 
executives to the top more quickly, presumably because of faster growth, and the way 
they do so is by holding fewer jobs along the way than do executives in older firms.  
Younger firms also do more outside hiring.  But age differences do not explain the 
overall difference in outcomes between 1980 and 2001.  The shift from manufacturing to 
the service sector would seem to be a promising place to look for an explanation of the 
changes in executive experience between 1980 and 2001.  But there are no differences in 
the attributes and experiences of executives in manufacturing vs. service firms until 2001.  
The nature of being an executive in manufacturing as compared to an executive in service 
firms seems to have changed over this period.   
 
Because there were no women in the sample in 1980, it is only possible to examine 
gender issues within the 2001 sample.  The manufacturing/service distinction is the only 
significant predictor of gender differences from the above analyses, with women being 
significantly more represented in the service sector.  In additional analyses available on 
request, we explored how the experiences of executive women in 2001 were different 
                                                 
33 With an average age of 52, most of these executives have been working approximately 30 years.  
Average tenure of about 15 years means roughly 15 years working elsewhere.    33 
from their male counterparts.  They were significantly younger (47 years vs. 52 for men), 
less likely to have been a lifetime employee (32 percent vs. 47 percent), they spent less 
time on average in each of their jobs (3.4 years vs. 4.0), and got to the executive ranks 
much quicker (21 vs. 25 years) than did their male counterparts.  The corporations in 
which they are employed are not significantly different than average in terms of age or 




The basic question asked at the beginning of this study, whether the attributes and career 
experiences of Fortune 100 executives are different in 2001 than in 1980, seems to have 
been answered with a clear “yes.”  The most important concern in substantiating this 
conclusion is the extent to which the executives examined in 1980 are truly similar to 
those in 2001.  The potential biases with the samples – more lower-level executives in 
2001 but more important jobs associated with much larger corporations – seem to offset 
each other.  And analyses with and without missing data suggest reasonably similar 
conclusions.    
 
Efforts to generalize these results to other contexts are more complicated.  The Fortune 
100 corporations are clearly significant in their own right given their enormous size and 
influence, and any differences in the nature of executive positions in them over time are 
therefore relevant as well.  In many ways, the choice of this sample – the largest, most 
stable firms – seems to stack the deck in favor of not finding changes in attributes or 
experiences.  Organizational inertia and resistance to change should be expected to 
reduce the incidence of differences, especially in the sub-sample of the same firms across 
                                                 
34 When executives are grouped into five broad job titles, the same pattern of results applies with the 
exception of CFO/CTO positions: 
    GENDER  N  Mean  Std. Dev   Sign 
C-SUITE  Female    10  22.80  9.47    .061 
    Male    216  27.43  7.51 
CF/T/O/O  Female    7  20.14  5.40    .318 
    Male    24  22.50  5.41 
EVP    Female    34  21.32  4.82    .019 
    Male    195  24.31  7.11 
Group Head  Female    15  21.27  2.05    .003 
    Male    147  26.50  6.55 
SVP    Female    28  20.93  5.84    .065 
    Male    206  23.62  7.37 
 
   34 
the two periods.  If we see changes in these firms, then, there are good reasons for 
thinking that changes may be even more likely in other corporations, which are smaller, 
younger, and were less invested originally in the “Organizational Man” approach to 
management. 
 
Understanding why these changes have occurred is a considerably more complicated 
question than simply assessing whether they have occurred.  Doing so carefully would 
require separate analyses for each issue – e.g., what factors drive changes in lifetime 
employment, changes in educational patterns, etc. – with separate models and hypotheses 
in each case.  Answers to that question await further research. 
  




Table A. The distribution of executive titles in 1980 and 2001 
 



































































































































































































































2 after a title = double title (e.g. CEO+CH) 
3 after a title= triple title (e.g. CEO+P+CH)     
 
Table B: A list of executive double and triple titles and percentages in 1980 and 2001 
 





































































































































































Table C. The three tiers of executive titles in 1980 and 2001 
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Distribution of Executives Across Organizational Charts by Industry 
Table D: The Distribution of Executive Titles in 1980. Percentages reported. The percentages in each row total 100 per cent.  
  CEO  CEO2  CEO3  CFO  CH  EVP  G  P  P2  SEVP  SVP  SVP2  VCH  VCH2  VP 
Aerospace    10.2      3.4  22.0  11.9  8.5  3.4    37.3    3.4     
Agriculture    22.2      11.1            44.4    22.2     
Automotive    9.1      7.3  45.5    9.1  3.6    20.0    3.6  1.8   
Business 
services 
  20.0        60.0              20.0     
Chemicals    10.4    2.1  8.3  8.3  31.3  6.3  4.2    25.0    2.1  2.1   
Communications          11.1  37.0    7.4    7.4  37.0         
Computer    4.8      4.8  4.8  28.6  4.8  4.8    42.9  4.8       
Construction          20.0  60.0      20.0             
Electric Utilities  2.2        2.2  32.6    8.7    4.3  39.1  2.2  6.5  2.2   
Energy    3.7  1.2  .6  7.3  27.4  .6  9.1  .6    46.7    2.4  .6  .6 
Food    6.3  1.0    7.3  33.3  9.4  8.3  1.0  1.0  26.0    5.2    1.0 
Healthcare          33.3      33.3      33.3         
Manufacturing  .7  9.4  .7    2.9  29.5  5.0  4.3  4.3    39.6    2.2  1.4   
Paper    8.3  2.8  2.8    33.3    2.8      50.0         
Photography    12.5        12.5    12.5      62.5         
Retail    9.5        19.0    4.8      61.9  4.8       
Steel  2.3  11.6      4.7  23.3  9.3  9.3  7.0    23.3  2.3  7.0     
Transportation  7.1  7.1  7.1        42.9    7.1    14.3    14.3     
Total  .5  7.1  .7  .4  5.5  27.3  6.9  7.2  2.5  .6  36.3  .5  3.5  .7  .2 
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Table E: The Distribution of Executive Titles in 2001. Percentages reported. The percentages in each row total 100 per cent. 
 
  CEO  CEO2  CEO3  CFO  CH  EVP  EVP2  G  P  P2  SEVP  SVP  SVP2  VCH  VCH2  VP  VP2 
Aerospace    8.2    8.2    14.3  4.1  14.3    4.1    18.4  26.5  2.0       
Automotive    3.6  3.6  7.1  3.6  3.6  3.6  42.9    3.6        7.1  7.1    14.3 
Business services    9.1                    63.6  27.3         
Chemicals    5.4  2.7    2.7  5.4  5.4  56.8    2.7    8.1  5.4  2.7  2.7     
Communications    11.3  1.9  3.8  2.8  17.0  6.6  13.2  1.9  2.8  2.8  26.4  .9  3.8  2.8  1.9   
Computer  1.9  8.7  1.0  1.9  3.9  18.4  6.8  8.7    3.9    35.0  5.8  3.9       
Consumer Products    50.0  10.0                  10.0  10.0    10.0     
Electric Utilities  11.1  4.8  3.2  1.6  1.6  4.8  4.8          30.2  28.6  6.3  1.6  1.6   
Energy  1.3  8.7  4.0  1.3  2.0  11.4  10.1  28.2    1.3    16.1  6.0  1.3  .7    7.4 
Entertainment    25.0        25.0        25.0  25.0             
Financial Services  2.1  4.7  2.6  5.7  3.6  21.4  8.9  17.2  1.0  3.1  3.1  14.6  3.1  7.3  1.6     
Food    11.1  1.9  5.6  1.9  14.8  11.1  11.1  1.9  3.7    13.9  14.8    3.7    5.6 
Healthcare    3.2  6.5  6.5  4.8  12.9  17.7  4.8        22.6  16.1    1.6  1.6  1.6 
Insurance    7.4  5.9  8.8  1.5  20.6  2.9    8.8  1.5  4.4  16.2  2.9  2.9  10.3  4.4  1.5 
Manufacturing    7.7  7.7  23.1  7.7      46.2                  7.7 
Paper    8.3        33.3  12.5  37.5        4.2  4.2         
Retail    3.6  3.6  1.2  2.4  31.7  14.4  10.2    1.8    25.7  4.8  .6       
Steel      12.5      87.5                       
Wholesale    8.3      8.3  50.0          8.3  25.0           
Total  1.3  7.2  3.1  3.8  2.8  18.4  8.6  15.4  .9  2.2  1.2  20.2  7.6  3.0  1.9  .6  1.8   44 
 
Table F: Distribution of titles by sector. 1980 
  CEO  CEO2  CEO3  CFO  CH  CH2  EVP  G  P  P2  SEVP  SVP  SVP2  VCH  VCH2  VP 
Service  1.6  3.2  .8    4.8  .8  28.2  4.8  7.3  1.6  3.2  36.3  1.6  4.8  .8   
Manufacturing  .3  7.6  .7  .4  5.2  .1  27.5  7.3  7.3  2.7  .1  36.2  .3  3.0  .7  .3 
Agriculture    22.2      11.1              44.4    22.2     
Total  .5  7.1  .7  .4  5.2  .2  27.3  6.9  7.2  2.5  .6  36.3  .5  3.5  .7  .2 
 
Table G: Distribution of titles by sector. 2001 
                                 
  CEO  CEO2  CEO3  CFO  CH  CH2  EVP  EVP2  G  P  P2  SEVP  SVP  SVP2  VCH  VP  VP2 
Services  1.6  5.8  3.4  4.1  2.8  .1  21.0  9.3  9.8  1.5  2.0  2.0  22.3  7.0  5.8  1.0  .3 
Manufacturing  .8  9.1  2.7  3.4  2.5    14.5  7.6  23.6  .2  2.5    17.1  8.4  3.6    4.0 
Total  1.3  7.2  3.1  3.8  2.7  .1  18.4  8.6  15.4  .9  2.2  1.2  20.2  7.6  4.9  .6  1.8 
 
Tables D and E show the breakdown of executive titles by industry in 1980 and 2001. Tables F and G show the breakdown of executive titles 
in three sectors: manufacturing, services and agriculture (for the 1980 sample) in the two time periods. The tables show the percentage 
distribution of each executive title in a given industry.  Sector differences seem relatively modest, arguably greater in 2001 – the more 
extensive use of EVPs in services and the greater use of Group Presidents in manufacturing are especially noticeable. 
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Representative Organizational Charts: 
 
COCA-COLA IN 1980 
Chairman 















EVP&CFO, EVP&General Counsel, EVP&President&COO, in charge of geo regions (5)   46 
 
SVP-s (10) 
In charge of a function (e.g. Strategy and planning) 
 
VP-s (40) 
In charge of a specialty function (M&A, Global HR Planning, Chief Creativity Officer) 
 
Presidents, regional (22) 
 
 
GENERAL ELECTRIC IN 1980 
Chairman 
Vice Chairman (2) 
SVP-s (6); SVP-s & Executives of a product-based sector (5) 
VP-s (85) who head product-based divisions 
 
 
GENERAL ELECTRIC IN 2001 
Chairman and CEO 
 
Vice Chairmen (3)   47 
 
SVPs (18) 




In charge of either a geo region (Asia, India, Europe), a product (Capital markets services, Entertainment, GE Nuclear, Plastics, National 
Broadcasting Co) or an operational area (Supply) 
 
VP-s (23) 
In charge of a specialty (Taxes, Six Sigma, Corporate Citizenship, Executive Development) 
 
 





VP-s (14): either heading a product division (Commercial Airplane Company Division) or a function (negotiations & pricing, industrial& 
public relations) 
Treasurer (1)   48 
 
BOEING IN 2001 
Chairman 
 




EVP-s (4), all have double/triple titles, e.g. COO, or President & CEO 
 
SVP-s (13) 
They either head divisions (Boeing Capital Corporation, Commercial Airplanes) or a function (General counsel, international relations) 
 
VP-s (40) they either head functions, product divisions or geo regions 
 
 
DU PONT IN 1980 
Chairman 
Chairman of the Finance Committee 
President 
SVP-s (4)   49 
VP-s (10), heading a product-based department (plastic products & resins) 
 
DU PONT IN 2001 
Chairman and CEO 
EVP&COO 
EVP& Chief Marketing Officer 
SVP & head of a function (4) 
Group VP-s (7) 
VP-s (41), heading a function (tax, safety) or a division 
Presidents (17), heading a product division, e.g. Global Apparel 
Regional Leaders (2), heading a geo region 




GENERAL MOTORS IN 1980 
Chairman 
President 
EVP-s (4), both in charge of a geo area (e.g. North American operations, overseas operations) and a function (design, engineering, 
manufacturing) 





GENERAL MOTORS IN 2001 
Chairman & CEO 
Vice Chairman & CFO 
Vice Chairman 
EVP (1) 
Group VP-s (9): headinga  division (e.g. GM Powertrain, GM Acceptance) or a geo area (North America) 
VP-s (31): heading a function or a geo region 
Chairman and Managing Director (2) 
President & Managing Director (4) 
Chief Accounting Officer, Chief tax Officer, Secretary, Treasurer, Controller  
 
 
COMPANIES IN HEALTHCARE 
 
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS IN 1980 
Chairman 
President   51 
Senior Vice President (2) 
VP (8) 












In charge of a function (HR, General counsel, Government relations) 
 
VP-s (16) 
In charge of either functions or product-based divisions 
 
Group Presidents 
   52 
Group EVP-s 
 
Group SVP-s  
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MEDIAN TESTS, WHOLE SAMPLE, 1980 VS. 2001 
 
MEDIAN VALUES AND MEDIAN TEST 
YEAR  Gender  AGE  Y of sch Pub (1)  Ivy(1)  Publ (2) Ivy (2)  Publ (3) Ivy (3)  Lifetim  Timetot  Avtenur Avpro  No of jo Orgtenure 
1980  1.00  56.0000 16.00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  1.00  29.0000 3.8000  1.1429  6.0000  20.5000 
2001  1.00  52.0000 18.00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  25.0000 3.4000  1.2500  4.0000  13.0000 
Total  1.00  54.0000 18.00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  .00  27.0000 3.6250  1.2000  5.0000  17.0000 
 
Gender  AGE  Y of sch Pub (1)  Ivy(1)  Publ (2) Ivy (2)  Publ (3) Ivy (3)  Lifetim  Timetot  Avtenur Avpro  No of jo Orgtenure 
N    1961  1409  1529  1506  1506  841  841  112  112  1848  1631  1511  1962  1865  1658 
Chi-Square    83.734  1.072  44.455  5.736  5.362  19.242  .046  .293  11.291  62.437  12.056  4.241  61.616  64.220 
df      1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Asymp. Sig.    .000  .300  .000  .017  .021  .000  .830  .588  .001  .000  .001  .039  .000  .000 
T- test result      .000                  .012  .004 
a  All values are less than or equal to the median. Median Test cannot be performed. 
b  Grouping Variable: YEAR01 
 
KRUSKAL WALLIS TEST, WHOLE SAMPLE, 1980 VS. 2001 
Gender  AGE  Y of sch Pub (1)  Ivy(1)  Publ (2) Ivy (2)  Publ (3) Ivy (3)  Lifetim  Timetot  Avtenur Avpro  No of jo Orgtenure 
Chi-Square  93.919  128.342 26.371  44.425  5.733  5.356  19.219  .046  .291  11.285  108.596 17.706  6.073  69.987  96.834 
df    1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Asymp. Sig.  .000  .000  .000  .000  .017  .021  .000  .830  .590  .001  .000  .000  .014  .000  .000 
T-test                          .012  .004 
a  Kruskal Wallis Test 
b  Grouping Variable: YEAR01 
  
 